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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-4266 
___________ 
 
XUE ZHI ZOU, 
        Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
       Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A079-092-389) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Susan G. Roy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 24, 2013 
 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 25, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioner Xue Zhi Zou seeks review of a final order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”).  For the following reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 Petitioner, a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, arrived in the United States 
in 2001.  Removal proceedings were initiated against him under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i); 8 
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U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in the United States without being admitted 
or paroled.  Petitioner conceded removability, but applied for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, based on his practice of 
Falun Gong.  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied relief, finding no past persecution or 
well-founded fear of future persecution, and ordered Petitioner removed to China.  On 
July 25, 2011, the BIA upheld the IJ’s decision.  On October 17, 2011, Petitioner filed a 
timely motion to reopen, arguing that he had recently converted to Catholicism and 
feared persecution on that basis if returned to China.  On April 3, 2012, the BIA denied 
reopening.  Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the BIA denied on October 24, 
2012.  Petitioner filed a counseled petition for review on November 21, 2012.
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 We begin by making clear the limited scope of this appeal.  We have jurisdiction 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) with respect to the BIA’s October 24, 2012 order denying 
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.  However, the petition for review was not timely 
filed within 30 days of either the BIA’s July 25, 2011 order upholding the IJ’s removal 
order or the BIA’s April 3, 2012 order denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1); Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995).  The 30-day limitation 
period is mandatory and jurisdictional.  See Vakker v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 519 F.3d 
143, 146 (3d Cir. 2008); McAllister v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 444 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 
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 Petitioner also moved for a stay of removal, which we denied on February 19, 2013. 
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2006).  Therefore, we have jurisdiction only over the order denying Petitioner’s motion 
for reconsideration of the earlier denial of his motion to reopen. 
The standard of review is quite deferential.  We review the BIA’s denial of a 
motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion, see Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 
398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005), and will not overturn the decision unless it is “arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.”  Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted).  We similarly review the denial of a motion to 
reopen using the “highly deferential” abuse of discretion standard.  Id.  Motions to reopen 
are granted only under compelling circumstances.  Id. at 561.  In order to prevail on a 
motion to reopen, the movant must establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought, 
INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 319 (1992), and satisfy the “heavy burden” of establishing 
that, if the proceedings were reopened, new evidence would likely change the outcome of 
the case, In re Coelho, 20 I.&N. Dec. 464, 472 (BIA 1992).
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In denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen, the BIA determined that although “the 
mistreatment of Christians” is a longstanding and ongoing problem in China, Petitioner 
had presented a “paucity of evidence” that Catholics were persecuted in his home 
province of Fujian and he had not presented persuasive evidence indicating that the 
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 The BIA’s April 3, 2012 order denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen erroneously stated 
that the motion was denied as untimely, even though the decision’s reasoning did not 
discuss timeliness and there was clearly no timeliness problem.  The BIA’s October 24, 
2012 order denying reconsideration noted the erroneous language in the prior order but 
found it harmless and concluded that there was no other legitimate basis upon which to 
grant reconsideration.  Aside from what was apparently a clerical error in the language of 
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Chinese authorities were aware, or likely to become aware, of his conversion to or 
practice of Christianity.  The BIA’s subsequent order denying reconsideration concluded 
that Petitioner failed to identify any material error in its decision denying reopening, 
noting that much of his reconsideration motion was simply a re-hash of his motion to 
reopen.  See In re O-S-G, 24 I.&N. Dec. 56, 58 (BIA 2006) (in order to prevail on a 
motion for reconsideration, the movant “must specify the factual and legal issues raised 
on appeal that were decided in error or overlooked in [the BIA’s] initial decision or must 
show how a change in law materially affects [the] prior decision”).  Petitioner’s appellate 
brief argues that his motion to reopen did indeed present sufficient evidence that 
Catholics were persecuted in Fujian, including (1) the International Religious Freedom 
Report for 2010 (“IRFR”) and its discussion of arrests of priests serving unregistered 
churches in Fujian; and (2) letters from his sister and father that stated that, on one 
occasion, his sister witnessed four or five residents of her village being arrested and was 
later told that they had been participating in an underground church. 
As an initial matter, we find that the BIA’s decision denying reopening thoroughly 
considered the evidence submitted by Petitioner.  The BIA’s decision on reopening noted 
that the IRFR does indicate that the treatment of unregistered religious groups varies 
significantly by region, but concluded that Petitioner had not presented sufficient 
evidence that persecution occurred within Fujian.  The BIA also reviewed the letters from 
Petitioner’s sister and father, but afforded them minimal weight because they were not 
                                                                                                                                                  
the April 3 order, we find the denial of reopening sound.   
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notarized or independently corroborated by similarly situated individuals in Fujian.  The 
BIA found that other evidence submitted by Petitioner, consisting primarily of 
generalized reports of religious oppression in China, could not be authenticated or did not 
persuasively demonstrate persecution of Catholics in Fujian.  Notably, in his appellate 
brief in this Court, Petitioner still does not address the BIA’s second and perhaps more 
persuasive rationale for denying reopening, namely that he failed to establish that any 
likelihood that the Chinese government would be aware that he was a Christian. 
More important for purposes of this appeal, however, is the content of Petitioner’s 
motion for reconsideration.  We find that the BIA accurately observed that Petitioner’s 
motion for reconsideration did not identify any material errors in its decision denying 
reopening.  Indeed, Petitioner’s reconsideration motion did not assert that the BIA 
overlooked some aspect of the IRFR report, erred by giving minimal weight to the letters 
from his father and sister, or ignored other evidence suggesting that Christians were 
subject to persecution in his home province of Fujian.  Instead, as the BIA noted, his 
reconsideration motion was substantially identical to his motion to reopen.  It was only in 
his appellate brief that Petitioner for the first time indicated that the BIA should have 
noticed that the IRFR specifically discussed the persecution of Christians in Fujian.  
Moreover, even if Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration raised such points, and even if 
they were legitimate, the motion contained no explanation of how Petitioner’s individual 
Christianity would come to the attention of the Chinese government.  Thus, even on 
reconsideration, Petitioner still did not address what was, by itself, a sufficient basis for 
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the BIA to deny reopening.  Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the BIA 
abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.3 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                              
3
 In his motion to reopen, Petitioner argued that similarly situated individuals had been 
granted asylum, but the BIA concluded that it had no way of knowing if those other 
aliens were indeed similarly situated.  In his motion for reconsideration, Petitioner again 
asked the BIA to consider these other cases by invoking its sua sponte authority pursuant 
to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).  In denying reconsideration, the BIA refused to exercise that 
authority.  We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to exercise its sua sponte 
authority.  Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 474 (3d Cir. 2003). 
